Turkey in a Changing Global and Regional Security Environment: Analysis and Recommendations

“Turkey's Approach to Security in the Twenty-First Century” Task Force Report

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Global Relations Forum (GRF) is an independent, non-profit membership association committed to being a platform for engaging, informing, and stimulating its members and all interested individuals in all matters related to international affairs and global issues.

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Global Relations Forum Task Force Report

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The Task Force members below reached a consensus on the framework and overall conclusions of this report. The members participated in the Task Force in their individual, not institutional, capacities. Thus, the opinions and views expressed in this Task Force Report do not necessarily represent the views of their institutions.
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Analyzing national security strategies from a broad temporal and geographic perspective and imagining institutions for the unforeseeable is always a challenging endeavor. This task is even more exacting today in Turkey, as the nation faces collapsing state systems to its south, ceaseless concerns about uranium enrichment to its east, and the defilement of national borders and sovereignty to its north.

First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to the distinguished Co-Chairs and members of the Security Task Force for their time and dedication in undertaking this difficult task and drafting a thoughtful, insightful and balanced report.

In many places around the world, national security has moved beyond the conventional understanding of protection of life and property, and encompasses a broader and more layered conception that seeks to preserve societies’ economic welfare, norms and values. While the scope of national security continues to expand, the plane on which security strategies and apparatus are built also keeps shifting. As technology advances and information flow accelerates, steady social equilibria become elusive. Societies are in a constant quest to recalibrate and reestablish that equilibrium.

Managing a dynamic social order while shielding it from threats coming from all directions will not be an easy task for
any country. The challenge is both internal and external. On the internal front, as the scope of what we are trying to defend and the range of threats expand, it will be necessary to articulate, formulate, and build consensus around fundamental codes of our societal systems to guide and anchor security policies. On the external front, countries have to recognize that most emerging risks or their resolution have a global dimension. That leads to an emerging policy imperative to develop a true understanding of the “tensions of the global system” and to be an engaged, constructive actor in diffusing those tensions.

With respect to the internal dimension, two qualities of the societal systems are likely to be critical in determining the success of security policies for all countries.

The first is the necessity for countries to have a social consensus about the norms and values that they are trying to protect. The lack of a common understanding of what a society is trying to protect makes the problem of security intractable. Certain societies are attempting to address this question based on the majoritarian norms and values that have their roots in their history, tradition, religion and culture. Yet majority lifestyles that are backed with only history or tradition-anchored norms flounder in managing the dynamism and emerging diversity of societies. Other societies are trying to preserve meta-values and social meta-structures that can accommodate different lifestyles and values. However, these pluralistic societies are also facing confusion about their fundamental consensus. A whole range of tensions stemming from issues like income distribution, security-privacy fault-lines and immigration policies are undermining the resilience of the existing social equilibrium underpinned by pluralist meta-values. Current global dynamics render social consensus on shared values and structures more essential but, at the same time, make it more difficult to attain sustainable pluralism.

In its survey of Turkey’s national security, our Task Force Report recognizes this underlying tension. The Report situates social consensus on key meta-values and meta-structures such as the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms, and
constitutional democracy at the center of security policy thinking. Not only must Turkey ensure a *modus vivendi* on common norms and conciliatory meta-values and meta-structures, but it must also maintain its steadfast determination to protect this pluralistic consensus.

The second important system quality on the internal front that requires attention for the upcoming era relates to the relationship between the society and its security institutions. Societies are structured to eliminate or contain threats mainly through security institutions. Operational trust among society and these institutions is a key prerequisite of a sustainable security paradigm. A well-functioning, healthy relationship requires that the security institutions operate within accountable and transparent political and social structures. Corrosive mistrust of various segments of a society towards the objectives or methods of its security institutions weakens the ability to manage security threats effectively. Fostering social trust is possible only through the meticulous enforcement of institutional and legal structures such as democratic control, conformity with fundamental rights and freedoms, and accountability. Security cannot be considered in isolation from institutions and the trustworthiness of these institutions in the eyes of the public.

On the external front, many tensions build up in interaction with global dynamics, and countries can neither avoid their consequences nor resolve them on their own. Therefore, countries must recognize the links between global dynamics and their national security risks. Liberal democracies that contemplate turning inward or compromising their values due to their economic or security-related concerns ignore this long-term trend at their own risk. On a very different plane, societies that have been stuck in a flawed model of political, social and even economic isolation from the world are facing ruinous consequences. In the current global context, social tensions and opportunities emerging in other parts of the world are not distant realities that can be ignored. No society can afford to be merely a concerned bystander or pursue a strategy of isolation. That mindset seems neither prudent nor realistic at this point in history.
In this context, national security policy requires contributing to the diffusion of global or regional tensions before they turn into threats and also to the resolution of manageable conflicts before they turn into structural security quagmires. The prerequisite for such an approach is to closely follow and comprehend the intricacies of these systemically important tensions as they develop. The Task Force recognizes this need and provides a framework to conceptualize the reciprocal relations between Turkey’s security policies and the world’s accumulating challenges.

Overall, the Task Force has undertaken an ambitious effort to analyze the trajectory of global security risks, assess Turkey’s adaptation to the new security context, and offer institutional recommendations within this framework. Numerous contributions by prominent experts at our meetings shed light on the roadmap that was developed.

I would like to extend my most sincere thanks to all members of the Task Force, who, with their diverse expertise and experience, demonstrated dedication and patience throughout this lengthy and demanding process.

Our Task Force Co-Chairs Ambassador Sönmez Köksal and Admiral Salim Dervişoğlu played a critical role in steering this process. Our Co-Chairs’ resolve, rigor, patience, and commitment to reach a consensus inspired the whole effort.

We are deeply grateful to Ambassador Ümit Pamir for devoting his valuable time to this study, especially during the drafting process. His intellectual vigor, extensive knowledge of and experience with the issues, and sensitivity to linguistic nuance contributed immensely to the final report.

We owe special thanks to Admiral Mustafa Özbey for assuming the primary responsibility for drafting the text. In this long process of consensus building, his dedication, resolve, and enthusiasm were indispensable.

Our Task Force Director and the Executive Director of GRF, Ms. Nigar Ağaoğulları Yalıncı, and Project Associate Ali Serkan Türkmenoğlu demonstrated personal ownership for this far-
reaching effort with an unwavering commitment from beginning to end, from the smallest detail to the most abstract concepts. I congratulate and thank them both for their patience, diligence, and good judgement. Finally, I would like to thank GRF Program Director Ms. Ezgisu Biber for her meticulousness and insightful suggestions in the tedious editing of the English text.

At a time when the scope of security is rapidly expanding and globalizing in a way that defies national borders, it is an ambitious and challenging effort to make enduring analyses and recommendations. Prepared in such a complex policy field, the Task Force Report highlights many valuable insights that are distilled from the shared wisdom and common sense of Turkey’s historical experience with security considerations in a very difficult corner of our globe. I hope that these observations will enrich and guide all efforts in addressing threats and crises which remain yet unforeseen, and that the report’s insights will inform and advance policy processes in the years to come.

Memduh Karakullukçu
GRF Vice-Chairman & President
Globalization has triggered new exigencies and challenges for international society, of which Turkey is an inseparable part.

In addition to these imbalances and uncertainties, recent developments in Turkey’s neighborhood render it acutely susceptible to novel risks and threats.

Considering Turkey’s unique but challenging geopolitical position, it is imperative to attentively observe developments in the global system and in the global balance of power and those in Turkey’s close proximity, and at the same time to formulate dynamic policies that guarantee the country’s security in the face of potential risk and threats.

Policymakers in state institutions are monitoring these risks and threats and drawing on their knowledge and experience to devise appropriate strategies. Yet the concept of security has widened in recent years into a common concern and responsibility for individuals as well as all segments of society.

Moving forward, civil society organizations must contribute intellectually to the debate about security policies in all countries.

This Task Force Report aims at sharing with the public the knowledge, experience, and views of GRF’s members, who have had ample experience and achievements in state institutions, academia, and business on security-related matters.

Bearing in mind that this effort is a pioneer in this field and in view of the inherent sensitivities of defining and analyzing security issues, the Task Force worked throughout an intense and extensive
calendar. It also hosted numerous distinguished speakers, who are experts and valuable assets in their respective fields. We thank the following individuals for their horizon-broadening contributions: Geoffrey Aronson, Director of the Foundation for Middle East Peace; Prof. Sertaç Hami Başeren, Department of International Relations Faculty Member at Ankara University; Murad Bayar, Former Undersecretary of Defense Industries and Prime Ministry Senior Advisor; Prof. Temel Belek, Former Vice President and Department of Mechanical Engineering Faculty Member at Istanbul Technical University (İTÜ); Ambassador Hüseyin Dirioz, Former Assistant Secretary General of NATO; Prof. Ekrem Ekinci, Former Vice President and Department of Chemical Engineering Faculty Member at İTÜ; Ambassador (Ret.) Rogelio Francisco Emilio Pfirter, Former President of Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); Prof. Serhat Güvenç, Department of International Relations Faculty Member at Kadir Has University; Ambassador Dr. İbrahim Kalın, Presidential Spokesperson and Former Prime Ministry Deputy Undersecretary and Senior Advisor; Prof. Ali Karaosmanoğlu, Director of the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research; Ambassador Ali Naci Koru, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ambassador (Ret.) Murat Özçelik, Former Undersecretary of Public Order and Security Bureau; Prof. Gencer Özcan, Department of International Relations Faculty Member at Istanbul Bilgi University; Dr. Ali Vaez, Senior Iran Expert at International Crisis Group (ICG); Prof. Fatoş Yarman Vural, Department of Computer Engineering Faculty Member at Middle East Technical University (METU); and Dr. Ömer Faruk Yarman, Former HAVELSAN Executive Director.

As Co-Chairs of this Task Force, we extend our appreciation and gratitude to all of its participants, who have patiently contributed to the preparation of this report by sharing their experiences and expertise. We owe special thanks to Ambassador (Ret.) Ümit Pamir, one of the exceptional figures in Turkish diplomacy concerning strategy and security issues, for sharing not only his profound knowledge and experience, but also his valuable time with us. We are also very grateful to Retired Admirals Mustafa Özbey and Ergun Mengi for their most valuable contributions in drafting this
report. Finally, we extend our deepest appreciation to Former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador (Ret.) Ertuğrul Apakan who, with his broad experience, has contributed significantly to finalizing this report.

As ever, GRF Vice-Chairman and President Memduh Karakullukçu guided us with his contributions and observations based on extensive knowledge, logic, and rationality. Our special thanks go to the Task Force Director and GRF Executive Director Nigar Ağaoğulları Yalınkılıç for her exemplary work, devotion, inexhaustible meticulousness, and valuable contributions. Project Associate and GRF Program Director Ali Serkan Türkmenoğlu’s undiminishing enthusiasm during the drafting of this report is beyond praise. We thank him for his contributions and tenacity that have made this report possible.

Naturally, while analyzing such a complicated subject as security, we cannot offer definitive conclusions and recommendations. Our aim as a civil society organization is to present our views to the public, stimulate new thinking about security, and provide an audacious example for similar institutions and organizations.

Finally, we will consider ourselves successful in this endeavor to the extent that this report contributes to Turkey’s panoply of ideas and insights.

Sönmez Köksal, Salim Dervişoğlu
Task Force Co-Chairs
“In light of the major developments that have taken place in every field over the last 20 to 30 years, Turkey must examine all aspects of its security at the national, regional, and global levels and make substantive periodic assessments that can yield far-sighted recommendations. As Global Relations Forum, we hope that this report encourages similar undertakings that will contribute to the vital issue of Turkey’s national security.”
The dynamics of globalization are transforming humanity on myriad levels. Uncertainties and chaotic situations are limiting the scope of predictability for policymakers. New actors are challenging the global system and its values and influencing world events, as Western countries’ share of global welfare is declining. The extraordinary revolution in information technology (IT) over the last three decades is also becoming entrenched in every aspect of our lives while we cannot yet anticipate the cost of our dependency. In addition, human pollution and destruction of the environment are eroding the world’s ecosystem, greenhouse gas emissions are approaching a critical threshold, and climate change is giving rise to potential disaster scenarios.

Moreover, globalization and demographic changes are amplifying the risk of conflict over humanity’s basic needs such as food, raw materials, water, and energy. At the same time, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, radical religious movements, transnational crime organizations, natural disasters, illegal migration, refugee movements, and human trafficking are assuming an international character and are impacting our daily lives.

The EU can no longer produce welfare at a scale on par with the past and is dealing with its own issues related to governance, integration, and the search for identity. At the same time, the United States is seeking new strategies to deal with its economic, social and financial problems, which are affecting other countries as much as the United States itself. Meanwhile, societies searching for fair and just governance, including Turkey, are voicing their demands more loudly, and individuals are attaining greater awareness thanks to IT, which in turn diminishes the effect of
state-oriented information. State administrations, for their part, are having trouble convincing societies of their arguments, now that citizens can turn to different sources of information. In the process, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states is being tested, the concept of sovereignty is losing its conventional definition, and the notion of shared sovereignty is expanding to new fields. As a result, the principle of self-determination is coming to the fore even in developed countries, and people are more intensely questioning the effectiveness and legitimacy of international institutions in tackling global challenges.

On the other hand, there are positive developments, too. For instance, the ratio of people living below the poverty line is gradually decreasing, while the middle class is expanding exponentially on the global scale. The significant growth of the middle class is also encouraging social movements, as the masses are creating opportunities to make their voices heard (*vox populi*). In addition, the global literacy rate is rising, and the accelerated rate of globalization and information flow over social media are increasing unofficial ties between countries and therefore the cost of future interstate conflicts, which is in turn reducing their likelihood.

Yet continental, regional, and national discrepancies in the distribution of global income, combined with limited resources, may increase the potential for conflict worldwide.

Amidst these cross currents, the security and economic problems of Turkey’s neighbors are worsening. Deepening sectarian polarization is threatening Turkey’s security and is exacerbating the already explosive conflicts and instability in the Eastern Mediterranean, Black Sea, the greater Middle East, and the Caucasus.

Recent developments inside and outside Turkey are also affecting Turkish domestic and foreign policy. Turkey must be able to assess how changes in its neighborhood affect global dynamics and the country itself and to adapt its security approach swiftly as developments emerge.
Turkey must harness its geography, history, and cultural heritage to understand regional developments and adjust its security policy accordingly. Since predicting crises is difficult, crisis management will be paramount. Whereas Turkey’s national security policies were historically designed to respond to “military threat perceptions,” today they need to encompass a much broader scope.

Since 2013, Turkey has changed its primarily armed struggle-based strategy against the PKK terrorist organization to a negotiation-based strategy. If this initiative succeeds, it will positively affect the economic, social, and security-related spheres for Turkey and the region. If it fails, there will be negative consequences, including the deepening of domestic conflicts. Meanwhile, the disintegration of Syria and Iraq and the settlement of new terrorist groups such as the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) to the south of Turkey may aggravate the instability in this already tumultuous region.

In light of the major developments that have taken place in every field over the last 20 to 30 years, Turkey must examine all aspects of its security at the national, regional and global levels and make substantial periodic assessments that yield far-sighted recommendations. As Global Relations Forum, we hope that this report encourages similar undertakings that will contribute to the vital issue of Turkey’s national security.
“Globalization laid the groundwork for the spread of democratic values and the market economy, but it also accelerated both segregating and unifying tendencies over people and nations. During the Cold War, the perception of security was focused on military threats, whereas with globalization, social, economic, demographic, technological, commercial, and financial threats have come to the fore.”
GLOBALIZATION, NEW SECURITY PARADIGMS, AND GLOBAL RISKS

The relatively peaceful atmosphere that emerged after the Cold War, together with advancements in IT, leant new momentum to the process of globalization. Globalization laid the groundwork for the spread of democratic values and the market economy, but it also accelerated both segregating and unifying tendencies over people and nations. During the Cold War, the perception of security was focused on military threats, whereas with globalization, social, economic, demographic, technological, commercial, and financial threats have come to the fore.

Since the end of the Cold War, national borders and sovereignty have been abraded; states have become more interdependent due to the market economy; state-specific security is not the overriding concern; and peace, welfare, and stability have become common objectives for states as well as individuals. Global society is exchanging money, commodities, information, and ideas through the Internet, creating multiple centers of power in which individual voices are heard. All these phenomena create a new way of life in which almost all individuals are stakeholders who communicate and interact with one another. The accelerating growth of technological, financial, capital, and foreign trade transactions has also increased the potential for the global contagion of problems and risks.

While these developments reduce the likelihood of “wars on a global scale,” globalization also produces disparities within societies that may trigger conflict.

In the process of globalization, the extent to which values and practices such as human rights, pluralist democracy, rule of law, and market economy come to be universally accepted will be one of the fundamental challenges of the twenty-first century.
In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, nationalism and ethnic or religious identity clashes led to the disintegration of some states and the formation of new ones. This process is ongoing.

Meanwhile, the September 2001 attack on the United States marked a new epoch of global religious polarization. Even though the Western world has now realized that categorically portraying Muslims as the enemy and associating them with terrorism aggravate the problem and help terrorist groups recruit more people to their causes, xenophobia and anti-Islamic sentiments have led to widespread religious polarization. According to some, these developments evoke a clash of civilizations that reverberates across different societies.

Globalization, which has permeated nearly every field, has only assumed a political dimension in the field of economic governance. The absence of international governance and the decline in the effectiveness of U.S. global leadership have led countries to shift their focus to regional arrangements, adopt more national perspectives, and question the merits of globalization. Despite the existence of various groups (G8-G20) and institutions, the absence of global political governance is one of the most fundamental problems of the twenty-first century.

Meanwhile, regional powers such as China, India, and Brazil have grown more assertive in projecting their power and steering the international system toward a multi-polar order.

The competition for raw materials is also intensifying between the West, where consumption is high, and the developing economies, whose consumer classes are growing. For the Western economies, global competition is sapping their influence over certain sectors that they previously dominated; this relative loss of welfare and employment is eroding the social and political consensus as well as threatening peace. For the developing economies, the growth in welfare is accompanied by a commensurate rise in people’s political demands from their governments.
A number of problems—financial and economic depression dating to the 2008 global financial crisis, social uprisings, dependencies created by energy and IT, demographic tendencies, climate-related and environmental problems, cyber threats, epidemics, the fight against terrorism and piracy, and illegal migration—leave states facing unfamiliar risks and threats. When states cannot overcome these problems themselves, they seek global and regional solutions. The extent to which states decide to cooperate or compete in shaping the new world order and its attendant institutions, rules, and ad hoc regulations will determine the security conditions of the future.

**Observations**

- *Globalization divides as much as it unifies.*
- *Globalization will maintain its centrality for the foreseeable future.*
- *While global problems and interdependencies render global cooperation imperative, the absence of global governance directs states towards regional and issue-based clusters in the quest for balance.*
- *Whether states cooperate or compete in shaping the new world order will determine the security conditions of the future.*
1. New Global Security Paradigms

Global security paradigms have undergone radical changes, especially in the last 20 years.

The nuclear balance and threat of total annihilation, which emerged as the main security paradigm after World War II, has diminished the likeliness of a large-scale armed conflict. At the same time, the possibility of non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons) or sophisticated conventional weapons is now a serious threat. It is also more likely that conflicts of varying degrees will occur in extended geographies both between countries and—on a wider scale—within them.

Security in the twenty-first century will need to take into account diverse concepts such as law, ethics, human rights, economy, environment and justice in addition to the options of using military power and sanctions. For instance, the scope of international awareness now includes the methods used by a country’s police and judiciary to intervene in domestic incidents.

It is likely that in the future, economic and social distress will prompt street movements of a larger scale than in the past. In some respects, we are entering an era during which countries will associate the management of the economy with issues of national security and public order.

Conventional risk and threat perceptions are undergoing a major transformation because it is becoming less evident where risks and threats begin. Due to asymmetrical risks and threats, policymakers should seek to understand the dynamics and trends of the future. In other words, countries have to be prepared for unforeseen scenarios.

Accordingly, instead of the concept of “collective security,” there is a greater tendency to employ the term “cooperative security,” which calls for the contributions of almost all stakeholders, international organizations, regional organizations, civil society organizations, economic institutions, and multinational companies alike. In the post-Cold War era, security is not confined
to military considerations but is also shaped by historical, social, cultural, political and economic factors. Moreover, states should include individual-oriented risk perceptions in their strategic security planning.

Peace, security, and progress are inseparable parts of the same construct. Soft power is obviously not a perfect substitute for military force but can serve complementary purposes and has wider appeal. All countries are trying to shape the new trajectory of the international system. If individual nations are asked to help shape common values and interests, it will become easier for them to assume shared responsibility for founding and adopting the new international system.

It can be projected that we are moving towards a new world order in which, rather than large-scale wars with definite fronts, regional and civil wars will predominate. In this context, it should be recalled that identities based on religion, ethnicity, and language predate nation states and have a considerably deeper history. Therefore, countries will have to struggle more frequently with domestic conflicts, strife stemming from religious intolerance, and turmoil created by phenomena such as racism. States should take proactive steps to steer developments, instead of responding to them after they unfold.

Conflicts will likely be in the form of indirect or proxy wars, partly because states will be increasingly reluctant to jeopardize their citizens’ lives through armed intervention. Yet states will deviate from this approach when their vital interests are at stake.
2. Major Global Risks and Threats

2.1 Technology-Related Risks

Developments in technology enhance the economic and security-related capabilities of countries while increasing direct and indirect security risks and threats. Consequently, state institutions will have to build and maintain their technological capacity, raise societal awareness about these risks and threats, and strengthen the reflexes of the state to deal with them.

The first direct risk for countries is related to cyber space. Cyber-attacks may compromise countries’ vital infrastructure by using cyber networks including security systems, energy networks, water, communication, financial systems, pipelines, transportation, air traffic control, and dams. Cyber-attacks may also seek to steal state or commercial secrets and may come from either another state or non-state actors. Oftentimes, it is difficult to identify the source of such attacks, making it nearly impossible to retaliate. As a result, this new risk also undermines the deterrence capacity of countries’ defense mechanisms.

Cyber threats are further magnified by the “internet of things”, i.e. the growth of mobile access and the ability of physical objects to connect to the Internet.

Cyber threats should therefore be approached as a permanent “systemic security problem” to be managed. International agreements should oversee and support efforts to contain the risk of mutually spiraling escalations, commercial theft, and espionage.

Recommendation

Turkey should devise a cyber-security strategy that comprises: the technical defense systems of critical public and private assets against potential cyber-attacks; methods for disconnecting the critical systems from the cyber network in the case of an extensive cyber-attack; and alternative structures to cyber networks for operating their systems.
Technology also allows for the easy and low-cost production of highly destructive instruments. Developments in biotechnology, for instance, could trigger epidemics, and 3-D printing could facilitate the low-cost and widespread production of guns and explosive devices. These capabilities will make it easier to terrorize societies, particularly in cities with growing populations.

**Recommendations**

- *Turkey should bolster society’s resolve to resist the security risks that may arise from developments in biotechnology and 3-D printing.*

- *Turkey should strengthen society’s awareness and self-protection reflexes against these new threats and invest in public health systems that can handle chemical and biological threats.*

*Indirect security risks*, such as the growth in space technology and cyber technology, may strain relations between major powers and threaten global stability.

**Recommendations**

- *Turkey must try to become constructively involved in international processes concerning space, cyber space, and nuclear technologies and accumulate and update its know-how to monitor technical developments in this field, as well as their political implications.*

- *Turkey must be prepared for the global consequences of asymmetrical threats from non-state actors as well as for the potential for deterioration in the global system.*
Many countries depend on global networks and will struggle to shield themselves from the contagious nature of emerging threats. For instance, damage to countries’ satellite systems will adversely affect their transportation, communication, and financial networks and hurt their economies; likewise, an attack on the systems infrastructure in any global financial capital will result in a crisis that damages all countries.

**Recommendation**

*Turkey should partake in efforts to protect global networks. Furthermore, it should establish backup systems to defend social and economic activities against the odds of unavoidable global network attacks.*

Technology-based, indirect security risks also change the fundamental dynamics of war. The increased use of drones as well as robots in ground operations should be closely monitored.

Finally, technology facilitates the rapid dissemination of information —accurate or inaccurate— that can mobilize different segments of society. A significant security challenge will therefore be to devise means to prevent destructive social dynamics and expand societies’ capacity to discern inaccurate information, without infringing upon democratic rights and the free flow of information.
2.2 Terrorism

Terrorism has become a global threat in recent decades. The September 2001 attack demonstrated that terror is unencumbered by boundaries or distance. The U.S. war on “global terror” has not solved the problem, nor has it prevented the emergence and consolidation of new terrorist organizations. Meanwhile, developments in the Middle East and Africa following the Arab Spring have intensified the activities of terrorist groups involved in proxy wars.

Today, global terrorism brings all countries face-to-face with the danger of a terrorist attack against their citizens and territorial integrity.

The conveniences offered by communication and transportation, as well as the permeability of borders, have made countries more susceptible to terrorist groups’ propaganda, recruitment, and local cell establishment. The case of ISIS is only the latest manifestation of this phenomenon. The threat of terrorism, previously of an external nature, has today become an internal threat for countries, as their citizens have begun enlisting in terrorist organizations. Societies will have to deal with the danger posed by foreign fighters returning to their countries of origin after partaking in terrorist activities abroad and debate the measures and punishments to be devised against these individuals. For now, the world requires an intense, coordinated effort by the entire international community to terminate all support for terrorist organizations in the areas of human resources, politics, finances, logistics, and weaponry-equipment.

Recommendation

*Emboldened by means of technology, terrorist organizations can now operate and communicate across much broader geographies. Conversely, global awareness about the fight against terrorism has enabled the inception of a political*
will, albeit presently insufficient, for a coordinated struggle against terrorism. As a country severely exposed to the threat of terrorism due to its geography, Turkey must, on the one hand, endeavor to coordinate with the international community, and, on the other hand, take the appropriate measures at the national level.

2.3 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Conventional Weapons

Today, it is far easier than ever before to access the technology, raw material, and know-how to construct nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional weapons. It is also easier to procure conventional weapons through the international black market. Greater access to weapons for individuals, groups, and states, as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, constitute a global security threat.

The largest risk is that non-state actors acquire weapons of mass destruction, which could lead to untold harm and shift the balance of power in the struggle against global terror. The tactics of coercive diplomacy used to prevent states from acquiring such weapons do not yield the desired results against terrorist organizations.

A global objective should be to prevent access to all sorts of weapons of mass destruction. The global community should devise measures to prevent terrorist groups from obtaining these weapons through commercial means or smuggling and from acquiring the technologies used to construct them.

Since the procurement of conventional weapons by non-state actors through illegal means prolongs and exacerbates armed conflicts, all countries should also cooperate to identify and eliminate financial resources for armed non-state groups and prevent them from obtaining these weapons through commercial means or smuggling.
As a country surrounded by terrorist activities and conflicts, Turkey should prevent non-state actors from acquiring all weapons, including small arms and light weapons, and dealing in or financing the global arms trade.

**2.4 Climate Change**

Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, humanity has consumed and polluted more rapidly than nature’s rate of self-renewal. The lack of control over greenhouse gas emissions has brought the risk of climate change to a critical juncture.

In the near future, the earth will reap the negative consequences of humanity’s inability to transition to a zero- or low-carbon economy. Humanity may respond in different ways. In one extreme scenario, key actors may spur a rapid, global turn towards a low-carbon economy. In another extreme scenario, actors may fail to reach an agreement, and countries will attempt to cope with the global consequences of climate change alone. Technology may help produce intermediate and alternative scenarios between these two extremes.

If humanity does not move to a low-carbon economy, and the planet undergoes irreversible climate change, security problems may arise on a global scale that are too adverse to be predicted and impossible for countries to deal with on their own. Drought and desertification would limit access to sources of food and water, and mass migrations would become inevitable, with disastrous consequences for the world.

On the other hand, should humanity transition to a low-carbon economy or technology abates the onset of climate change, new economic sectors and opportunities may emerge.
2.5 Economic and Financial Vulnerabilities

The market economy, which dictates the world’s economic system, liberates capital and commodity movements, but it also kindles global economic and financial crises that damage countries’ economies and exacerbate social tensions.

International capital may breed new vulnerabilities that unsettle economic balances. While global finance supports production and trade, its speculative entry into and exit from certain commodity markets and sectors may also undermine the integrity of the economy and the political system.

New tendencies and shifting centers of political and economic gravity among global powers as well as the structural imbalances in the world’s production, consumption, and sharing systems reveal the necessity for a radical and comprehensive change. This transformation will not be easy.

Economic and financial sanctions are increasingly employed to pacify regional conflicts and forge global security. A country’s ability to endure such sanctions will likely become an important tool of crisis management and will be determined by that country’s global economic and financial positions and capacity. Yet sanctions will impact not only the country subject to them but also other countries that have significant economic and trade relations with the sanctioned country.
Turkey’s increasing integration into the global economy make the country susceptible to the global economy’s positive and negative developments. To defend against global economic and financial fragilities, Turkey should strengthen its own economic structures and help strengthen the structures of global economic governance.

2.6 Demography-Related Risks

The world population grew from 2.5 billion in 1950 to 7 billion in 2011 and, according to the UN’s 2012 projection, it will reach 9.6 billion in 2050, after which it will plateau. Previously, it was believed that population growth would place limits on resources and the environment and trigger conflicts, but these concerns have abated thanks to technological breakthroughs, female employment, and international and national policies on population planning. Today, even though population growth does not pose a direct security risk for countries, disproportions in the composition of the global population and demographic trends such as age distribution, urbanization, and migration are creating security risks. Within this framework, demographic trends not only become issues for individual countries, but also create risks at the global level.

While overpopulation threatens many developing countries, developed countries face a different problem: population decline and aging are reducing the number of people who are entering the workforce. This workforce deficit means that there are fewer economically active people to take care of retiring populations. At the same time, social security costs are set to rise. If these trends continue, developed countries will be unable to sustain their current level of economic welfare and performance. Over the long run, foreign labor and automation can help counter the workforce deficit, but these policies can also trigger social upheaval and unsettle their otherwise homogeneous demographic
structures. Aging populations may even trigger changes in the health systems and military power of developed countries.

Developing countries in Africa and Asia, on the other hand, are experiencing high fertility rates, population growth, and a rapid increase in people joining the workforce, which is enabling them to claim a larger share of global economic growth.

Meanwhile, urban populations are projected to swell across the world, which, along with the burgeoning of megacities, will create new risk factors. The gap between a society’s socio-economic expectations and the adequacy of the services that are delivered by governments could widen and catalyze opposition and domestic instability. In countries with young populations, dim employment opportunities and ineffective policies to create jobs could exacerbate the risk of conflict.

Finally, the fact that there are more economic opportunities in developed countries triggers migration or massive population movements into them. Migration has turned into a transnational issue that needs to be addressed at the global level. Economic migration, if managed properly, may offer real opportunities both to host countries and migrants and help reinforce stability by providing economic opportunities to youth coming from developing countries. On the other hand, the inadequacy of integration policies in host countries may cause profound social cleavages and sow the seeds of later conflicts. In this context, the problems of unregulated migration and integrating refugees into host countries require urgent solutions so that host countries can ensure domestic security and reduce social costs.
### Recommendations

- *Turkey can transform its young and dynamic population into an asset by providing modern education and employment. Accordingly, it should emphasize the education and employment of women.*

- *According to the prospective population scenario of the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), the percentage of individuals over the age of 65 in Turkey is 8%, but will increase to 10.2% in 2023 and 20.8% in 2050. Therefore, Turkey needs to consider its aging population when devising policies.*

- *The civil war in Syria has caused roughly two million refugees to enter Turkey. In order to mitigate the threat of a domestic security problem with high social costs, immigration policies must include institutional reforms in the fields of culture, education, and employment that seek to integrate refugees into the society.*

- *The growth of megacities across the world leads to adverse effects such as social and economic inequality, ill-organized urbanization, and environmental pollution. With a population approaching 15 million, Istanbul is already a megacity. Therefore, social, economic, and legal arrangements to counter these adverse effects should be designed and implemented in Istanbul.*
“Global institutions are failing to devise solutions to global problems. The ‘global governance deficit’ is fast becoming the fundamental problem of the international community.”
1. The United States

The twentieth century was in a sense the “American Century.” Surpassing Britain as a global power following World War I, the United States assumed leadership of the Western world after World War II. The “total destruction” strategy adopted in the aftermath of World War II was gradually replaced by the concepts of flexible response, peaceful coexistence, détente, and containment. This new global strategy marked an important milestone in the international system.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) and the Warsaw Pact, the United States led the expansion of Western values and the NATO security umbrella to the east and helped realize the EU, the great political, economic and ideological transformation of continental Europe.

In this period, the global economic, financial, and military superiority of the United States, along with the opportunities facilitated by the U.S. dollar, further favored its ascent. More importantly, the unexpected, rapid dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact led global actors to perceive the United States as a world hegemon.

Yet the September 2001 attack by Al-Qaeda undermined the perception of the United States as the world hegemon and eroded its untouchable image. It also demonstrated that asymmetric threats can be effective against great military powers under certain circumstances.
In response, the United States waged wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that had dire economic, financial, and political consequences and created divergences between the threat perceptions of the EU and those of the United States. Then, the global financial crisis that originated in the United States in 2008 revealed the limits of U.S. power, as well as that of the EU and the Western world.

Despite these limits, the United States will likely maintain its global economic and technological pre-eminence for the next decade thanks to its commitment to research and development (R&D), innovation, and intellectual property (IP) and its capacities in the fields of space technology, biotechnology, IT, artificial intelligence, and material (nanotechnology) and fundamental sciences, even if a lower share of its gross national product is allocated to these areas. Along with its sweeping superiority in nuclear and conventional weapons, the United States can effectively employ soft power and smart power without engaging in physical combat.

U.S. officials have recently stated that the country will act more cautiously in its overseas interventions and try to abstain from direct military interventions with ground troops for the foreseeable future, unless its “vital interests” are directly threatened or it is subjected to an open attack. U.S. policies in Libya, Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq—not to mention the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program—reveal this new posture. Within the framework of its foreign policy, the United States will likely resort to sanctions and other forms of coercive diplomacy in future crises.

China’s recent rise has shifted the strategic priority of the United States to the Asia Pacific region, but transatlantic relationships will always be of paramount importance for the United States because of security reasons, as well as economic interdependence and shared values. The renewed interest of the United States in a transatlantic trade treaty reaffirms this priority; the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) seeks to expand bilateral trade and investments between EU and U.S. companies.
No large-scale war is expected in Europe in the near future. As long as Europe does not face a serious threat, the United States will encourage Europe to assume more responsibility for its own security. At the same time, the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine crisis are generating long-term uncertainty, which may require more vigor for the signing of the TTIP. While the United States regards Europe as an equal partner in trade and economic relations, in the field of security, the United States expects “timid” Europe to be more assertive in its own region.

In the Pacific region, the United States and its allies are also making progress towards completing a new trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The creation of vast free trade areas in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans will certainly bolster the U.S. position with global and regional consequences.

Meanwhile, the recent boom in the exploration and production of shale oil and gas in the United States, along with abundant new hydrocarbon resources in Canada, Brazil, and Venezuela, have enabled the United States to procure most of its hydrocarbon supplies from its own hemisphere. Whereas previously the United States depended more on foreign energy sources, these resources will allow the United States to adjust its energy and national security strategies accordingly. When the shale oil and gas revolution is combined with global efforts to increase energy efficiency, the United States appears, for the first time in recent history, to have the opportunity to become a dominant, global power in energy geopolitics. In addition, a prospective sea route through the North Pole and the expansion of the Panama Canal will expand the global trade of energy and commodities between the United States and other countries.

By curbing its energy costs, the United States may recoup the advantages that it lost to global competition in recent years, but it is uncertain whether it will become a major energy exporter. Other questions include: What will be the scale, scope and timing of U.S. strategies to decrease Europe’s dependence on Russian energy supplies? Will the United States maintain its unconditional support to some countries for the sake of energy
security? Will the United States amend its conventional energy security-based Middle East policy towards the Gulf countries and Israel? Intense discussions should be expected regarding these and other questions, the answers to which could affect Turkey to a great extent. Nonetheless, the United States will likely continue to safeguard its primary interests in the Middle East: securing energy supplies for its allies, keeping sea lines of communication open, and monitoring its potential rivals such as China, who will grow more dependent on the oil from the Middle East.

### Observations

- **International developments in the twentieth century transformed the United States into a superpower.** Even though the United States is not likely to escape the relative decline of the West, it will remain the most prominent global power for the foreseeable future because of its unmatched geographic position; internal dynamics; demographic advantages; unrivaled military power; predominance in fields of fundamental sciences, space and information technology among others; and commitment to R&D.

- **Compared to the twentieth century, the United States will be more cautious and will not intervene directly as long as its vital interests are not at stake.** Consequently, issue-based partnerships and regional arrangements will gain prominence.

- **Additionally, drones, cyber war, and indirect methods of intervention will presumably come to the fore.**

- **The scope, depth, and modalities of the U.S.-Chinese cooperation will be vital to resolving future global problems.** Whether the two counties cooperate or compete will have consequences for the world. The realization of this objective, however, will require a long and intense effort from both sides.

- **Even if the United States becomes self-sufficient in meeting its domestic demand for hydrocarbons, it will preserve its interest in the Middle East.**
Turkey: Observations and Recommendations

- The global and regional policies of the United States will continue to affect Turkey.

- Turkey is not the sole leading actor in the region, so it should adopt policies that can shape American and Western policies for the region. Moreover, regional stability and peace are only possible to the extent that consensus is reached at both the global and regional levels.

- Despite the shifting geopolitical priority of the United States towards the Asia-Pacific region, Turkey and its surrounding regions will remain within the U.S. sphere of interest.

- Without jeopardizing its geopolitical ties with the transatlantic alliance, Turkey should prioritize developing its relations in every field with the emerging global centers of power.

- Remaining outside the free trade areas that have started to take shape in the Atlantic and Pacific regions may create trade losses for Turkey, increase security risks, and present an affiliation/identity issue.
2. The European Union (EU)

The EU has been a central player in shaping the global world order. Throughout history, significant universal concepts were first conceived in Europe and then spread around the world. In North America, the United States and Canada were founded on similar values and norms that have now expanded to parts of Asia. Additionally, the concentration of the advanced economies in Europe and North America in a transatlantic alliance after 1945 helped ensconce the EU as a global economic bloc. Hence, Europe transformed from abiding by a centuries-long interstate “war system” to an integration-based “peace system.”

After the collapse of the USSR, the EU rapidly expanded to the east. Yet the limited ventures to create a “European security identity” have failed; the EU does not have the capacity to conduct its own military operations, and the United States will continue to provide security for it for the foreseeable future.

The global financial crisis in 2008 quickly spread from the United States across the globe and revealed the depth and insolubility of the structural problems in the EU’s current architecture. In the process, the EU’s solidarity has been called into question.

The social costs incurred by austerity measures taken to reduce fiscal deficits and public debts have caused racist, xenophobic, and Islamophobic movements to escalate in a number of EU member states. These movements have gained some degree of political momentum and have led certain social segments to question the “common set of European values.”

Another fundamental problem for the EU is its declining and aging population, which may not be solved without receiving more immigrants. Yet this policy option may revitalize political parties that ostracize migrant minorities, creating social strife and polarization.

The Ukraine crisis could also signal a new period of geopolitical significance for Europe. With its annexation of Crimea, the Russian Federation used military power in the same way that
it did in Georgia in 2008. These developments might cause the EU and NATO to reevaluate their eastward expansion policy in Europe and could trigger a period of tension reminiscent of the Cold War. This mutual mistrust presents risks, even if the chances that parties engage in direct conflict are slim. It is difficult to predict how this period of tension will unfold.

The Ukraine crisis constitutes a serious test for the peace and welfare system founded by the EU and safeguarded by the European security and stability architecture since the 1990s. The crisis has also highlighted the security risk of Europe’s dependence on Russian energy supplies, but it will take a considerable amount of time for Europe to reduce this dependency on Russian energy and diversify its supplies without creating a security risk in the near term. The EU’s options include importing shale gas from the United States, extracting its own shale gas or increasing its purchases from liquefied natural gas (LNG) suppliers. Yet the fact that these strategies require long-term planning means that the EU should prioritize the resources to its east in the Caspian Sea, Iran, Iraq, and the Eastern Mediterranean.

In addition to energy security, the Ukraine crisis may further deepen and accelerate the EU’s own structural problems and test its ability to overcome future challenges in continental Europe.

Finally, the EU faces challenges from instability in the Near East, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. EU citizens who originated from these geographies may become an important factor on the EU’s domestic security agenda.
Observations

- The EU is a peace and welfare project on a continental scale.
- Should the EU fail to devise solutions for the various issues that it faces—migration, xenophobia, aging populations, economic and financial problems, and search for identity—these issues will likely have repercussions on the global level.
- The EU and the United States will continue to have a mutual need to cooperate for the foreseeable future. The TTIP will be as much a priority for the EU as it is for the United States.
- EU-Russian Federation relations will be critical to ensure the sustainability of peace on the continent. They may also lead to the search for new balances both among the EU’s members and in the members’ bilateral relations with Russia.
- Energy security will be a matter of strategic significance for the EU for the foreseeable future.

Turkey: Observations and Recommendations

- The following can be cited among the reasons for the ambivalent approach of EU members towards Turkey: cultural differences, the insecurity of Turkey’s borders, the attitude of religious circles in Europe towards Islam, Turkey’s large population, deficiencies in the fields of human rights, liberties, law and democracy, and problems of governance. The EU’s embrace of concepts such as “variable geometry” or “concentric circles” may facilitate Turkey’s accession to the EU.
- If one leg of transatlantic relations is the United States, the other one is the EU. A positive course in Turkish-EU relations would mutually enrich both identities.
• *Even though full integration into the EU is a long-term project, relations with it anchor Turkey’s democratization and adoption of universal norms in every field. Therefore, the commitment to the EU accession process is of vital importance for Turkey.*

• *Turkey’s contribution to Europe’s energy security will increase due to its proximity to the energy resources of Iraq, Iran, the Caspian region, and the Eastern Mediterranean and to Turkey’s role as a conduit for pipelines and seaborne tankers that convey this energy to Europe.*

• *A stable Turkey where EU standards are implemented will be stronger in its relations with developing countries, primarily the Middle Eastern and Islamic countries, and the EU will perceive Turkey as a more prominent player.*

### 3. The Russian Federation

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and a period of great hardship in the 1990s, high energy prices helped the Russian Federation reemerge as a stable power and major energy supplier over the last decade. Today, Russia’s actions merit attention in the global and regional context.

At the same time, Russia faces many risks, including: the lack of a production sector of global significance outside of hydrocarbon production and export, demographic decline, alcoholism, problems in the health system, aging, radical movements, and the surge in its Muslim population.

Lack of trust and competition already characterize U.S.-Russian relations, but recent developments in Ukraine and Crimea brought further uncertainty and stagnation to them. Meanwhile, U.S. shale oil and gas may compete with Russia’s conventional hydrocarbon production in the medium- to long-term, place downward pressure on energy prices, and diminish Russia’s geopolitical power in energy. It might also initiate an era during
which the United States joins the ranks of important producers in
the global energy balance.

On the other hand, Russia also no longer monopolizes energy
exports from Central Asia, where oil and gas producing countries
have forged alternative transit routes with new partners.

The eastward expansion of the EU and especially NATO is
the main worry for Russia and shapes its policies in Georgia,
Abkhazia, Crimea, and Ukraine.

Perceiving Ukraine’s integration into the West as its own
red line, Russia annexed Crimea. On the grounds of security
and stability, Russia seeks to monitor developments in Ukraine
and the neighboring Eastern European countries. Furthermore,
Russia aspires to have influence on the security architecture of
Europe. However, this policy is not a cost-free; time will reveal
the magnitude of future costs. Nonetheless, it appears that Russia
annexed Crimea after weighing the cost of the West’s reaction
against the strategic advantage that it would gain in the region.

On the other hand, Russia and the West are still collaborating
to fight religious extremist movements, terrorism, and drug
trafficking in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Russian interests in
those regions overlap with those of the West.

From the perspective of the United States, Russia will preserve
its status as one of the key actors in both Central Asia and the
Middle East. The issues of Iran’s nuclear program, global terror,
and radical movements are additional points of common interest
for the United States and Russia. Finally, China will constitute yet
another important factor influencing U.S.-Russian relations.

As the United States pulls out of Afghanistan, Russia will
presumably exert more vigorous efforts to increase its influence
in Eurasia, but the EU, the United States, and China will try to
constrain Russia’s options.
Observations

- Following the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, Russia quickly became an important power.

- Managing its own energy resources and exerting influence over global energy transit and supply will be among Russia’s important foreign policy objectives. Russia is also taking a keen interest in the new energy deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean.

- The EU is Russia’s largest and the most strategic energy client. Following the Ukraine crisis, EU-Russian energy relations transformed from a strategic partnership to one of risk management. The latest energy cooperation agreement between Russia and China signals that Russia seeks to diversify its markets.

- Russia will continue to increase cooperation with the Western world in fighting terrorism, religious extremism, and drug trafficking.

- Russia’s lack of a production sector of global significance, except for hydrocarbon production and export, is a source of vulnerability for the country.

Turkey: Observations and Recommendations

- The Ukraine crisis left Turkey face-to-face with a dilemma. It is stuck between NATO and its conventional Western allies on the one side, and Russia on the other. Turkey’s participation in Western economic and financial sanctions imposed on Russia will have implications for Turkey’s policy decisions.

- Even though the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Economic Union are not expected to develop into an economic integration model like the TPP and the TTIP, the fact that Russia is a member of these
organizations requires Turkey, who has close relations with the Central Asian countries, to follow their activities closely.

- Russia’s annexation of Crimea on the grounds of the right to self-determination may further destabilize the geography surrounding Turkey. These developments may also pose grave challenges of sovereignty.

4. China and the Emerging Economies

The upcoming era will likely witness China and other emerging economies gain a larger share of global economic production and greater influence in shaping global processes.

China’s double-digit economic growth rate sustained until recently, its massive domestic market created by a population of 1.37 billion, and its unique governance structure and decision-making process have allowed it to shape global processes. Yet China is entering a new era in which social demands for democratic rights and freedoms will increase due to growing regional discrepancies in the distribution of welfare and its burgeoning middle class. How China will adapt the governance model that it has implemented until now to these new demands will be one of the defining questions of the twenty-first century.

The economic growth rate in China and in other emerging countries after the 2008 global financial crisis has begun to slow. These countries are also experiencing nationalist movements triggered by socio-economic problems.

China’s unique governance and growth rate have bound the country’s different religious, linguistic, and cultural groups during its development, but it is difficult to predict how long this will last. China faces regional risks, including those related to Tibet and Inner Mongolia, and is vulnerable to conflict arising from the income disparity between the population living along its coast and those inland. The issue of the Uyghur Turks as well as the
social movements in Hong Kong will be potential challenges for the Chinese government.

For the foreseeable future, though, China will presumably maintain its policy of non-interference in the domestic matters of other countries and organizations with the utmost sensitivity.

The nature of U.S.-Chinese competition differs from that of the U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War. The Communist Party of China aims to retain its power, whereas the Soviet Union stoked ideological revolution on a global level. Economically, the United States and China are closely intertwined. In addition to the large volume of trade between the two countries, the United States is indebted to China more than to any other country. This degree of interdependency decreases the risk of conflict between the two countries.

The issues of sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction are creating tension and may spark conflict between China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, which would upset U.S.-China relations.

Rather than catching up with the United States on a military level, China’s current long-term strategic priorities may be summarized as deterring the United States from going to war for Taiwan, strengthening its role in international markets, and increasing its power in the region. In this respect, it is possible to define the relationship between the two countries wherein cooperation and strategic competition are intertwined.

As countries with large populations such as China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia become greater participants in global production and consumption, global demand for basic materials will continue to increase. As welfare levels rise, democratic expectations and demands for rights and freedoms might also rise, and the resulting instabilities may slow economic development and growth. We have recently witnessed how economic crises in the EU destabilized even established political structures. Even though the EU’s institutionalized democratic order does not resolve the problem at hand, it does enable the democratic change of governments. In the majority of developing countries,
however, the practice and institutions of democracy are not fully ingrained, which makes their problems more prone to catalyze into severe crises.

Aside from China, a new economic grouping of emerging markets comprising India, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa, and some other African and Latin American countries is assuming a greater role and responsibility in the global economy. Among these, India particularly stands out for its contributions to IT, biotechnology, and space research. While each of the countries that fall into this group has their own vulnerabilities, their global influence will probably increase for the foreseeable future.

### Observations

- **It appears that it will be more difficult for China to maintain its impressive economic performance, which yielded high growth rates and foreign trade surpluses in the last three decades; its slowdown, however, has become evident in the past few years. This situation may weaken China and have repercussions for the world economy.**

- **One of the most important sources of political power for the Communist Party of China is the level of economic development that it has achieved. The slowdown or stagnation of economic growth may undermine the party’s legitimacy.**

- **Another source of legitimacy for the Communist Party of China is nationalism. According to some circles, if the economy slows, unemployment rises, and public opposition against corruption grows, the party may embroil itself in foreign policy issues to overcome its domestic problems.**

- **Chinese-U.S. relations will fluctuate along a spectrum that ranges from cooperation to hostile competition; these fluctuations have major repercussions for the global security environment.**

- **Naturally, as the middle class grows and welfare spreads in China, democratic demands will also increase.**
Turkey: Observations and Recommendations

• The actions that China takes as a global power will impact Turkey as much as any country. It is essential to monitor developments in China and its dependence on Middle East energy in particular.

• Turkey, which regards globalization as the driving force of economic development, should continually pursue its objective of developing uninterrupted strategic relations with countries such as China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil.
5. Global Institutions

The prominent institutions of global governance are falling short of addressing the evolving needs of the twenty-first century. Starting with the United Nations (UN), a number of international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and GATT/World Trade Organization were founded by the victors of World War II, the United States and its allies, who outpaced their rivals in all spheres and exerted dominance over the global system.

The fact that the UN is losing its effectiveness in resolving global problems has serious consequences. The UN’s final decisions are subject to the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council, but this process does not befit the twenty-first century. The inability to reach decisions about military intervention or sanctions due to the veto mechanism of the Security Council leads to small coalitions that lack international legitimacy or to attempts to seek solutions to global problems by way of certain *ad hoc* arrangements or through various regional organizations such as ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab League, the African Union, the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and the West African Economic and Monetary Union.

The “common threat perception” among allies, which was the *raison d’être* of NATO, is evolving in line with the emerging priorities following the radical changes that international relations have undergone.

Decades after NATO achieved its founding objective of deterring aggression and preventing conflict in Europe, it expanded its scope of interest due to globalizing risks and threats. For the foreseeable future, this institution will continue to be the most important component of the security architecture on a global scale. “Burden sharing” among allies, which was an issue even during the Cold War, has become even more problematic with some European members gradually retrenching their contributions and responsibilities. The United States has
also begun to reduce its defense spending due to the financial crisis. NATO is currently seeking a variety of formulas such as smart defense, pooling and sharing, and global partnerships to tackle these challenges. The Ukraine crisis, followed immediately by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the major turmoil in the Middle East, may alter the security perceptions of European countries and the strategic concept of NATO.

### Observations

- *Global institutions are failing to devise solutions to global problems.* The “global governance deficit” is fast becoming the fundamental problem of the international community.

- *The dynamics to be created by trade blocs that are forming in the Pacific and Atlantic regions will assume both political and security dimensions, and thereby will certainly address to some extent the deficit in global governance.*

- *Collective resolve is required for the existing institutions of global governance to respond to the needs of the international community and to design new ones.*

- *The fact that institutions of global governance cannot adapt to current conditions impels countries to turn to regional arrangements and initiatives.*

- *NATO will continue to be indispensable to its members’ security and the global security architecture.*
The strategic priority for Turkey is membership in the EU and strengthening its transatlantic ties, while positioning itself in accordance with emerging initiatives. Its membership in the G-20 will give Turkey the opportunity to actively contribute to global governance.

Turkey should sustain its efforts to help shape a new system of global governance and reform existing global institutions. Being a party to the TTIP would be significant for Turkey, not only for trade and economy, but also for political and security reasons.

The negative consequences of the global governance deficit are felt in the geography surrounding Turkey. Turkey should shape its own national interests and security policies with the assumption that global institutions might make limited contributions.

Turkey should, in collaboration with academia, enrich the intellectual basis of its diplomacy in order to formulate comprehensive recommendations for new global governance structures.
“Competition and conflicts of interest between global and regional actors can be expected to continue in Turkey’s surrounding geography for the foreseeable future. Therefore, Turkey must advance its statecraft to ‘manage differences and discrepancies’.”
Turkey’s geography, history, religion, and culture have positioned it as a center of gravity along the east-west and north-south axes. This confluence should have been an asset for Turkey, but has instead raised a problem of identity and spawned numerous risks.

For the foreseeable future, the most significant threats from Turkey’s surrounding geography will stem from the ongoing problems related to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

With the exception of the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, Turkey has managed to stay out of armed conflict with its neighbors since the foundation of the Republic in 1923, remaining neutral during World War II. This heritage of peace is the result of the commitment to Atatürk’s principle of “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” and suggests that Turkey may be able to peacefully deal with the risks and threats emerging in its surrounding geography, except in unavoidable situations.

By virtue of its geography, the turmoil in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East will directly affect Turkey and threaten its security. Recent convulsions in the surrounding geography are expected to last for the foreseeable future with unpredictable consequences.

Yet Turkey’s proximity to hydrocarbon energy reserves allows it to act as a bridge and hub for transporting these resources to world markets, which could become an asset. Similarly, the management of the transboundary waters that run through Turkey should be kept in perspective when formulating security policies.
Observations

- Countries can ensure their security to the extent that they implement policies dictated by their geographies.
- Turkey has a central position in Eurasia at the confluence of maritime, land, and air transportation routes.
- The fate of countries in this geography is “interdependence”, which requires comprehensive and institutional cooperation based on shared interests and a shared fate. Successful cooperation can make Turkey preeminent in the region.

Following the September 2001 attack against the United States, Western countries identified radical Islam as a top threat and adopted an approach that was coined the “Global War against Terror.” This approach has helped not only to marginalize Islam and ostracize Muslims but also entrenched the Taliban in Afghanistan and Islamic governance in Pakistan. More significantly, radical terrorist groups are trying to recover the ground that they lost in Afghanistan under different names—such as ISIS—in other countries, most notably Syria, but also in Libya, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. The internal dynamics in these countries, along with external interventions, will determine how much ground they gain.

The armed radical jihadist factions in Afghanistan have expanded throughout the Islamic world, not only in the Middle East. Fueled by Western “Islamophobia,” a spiral of mutually aggravating violence has unfolded.

Because the Arab-Israeli conflict remains unresolved, the United States has focused its attention on managing the stalemate rather than on promoting a solution. The conflict enables radical Islamic groups to attract new recruits and supporters.

The turmoil in the Islamic world constitutes a major source of global uncertainty and instability. The Arab uprisings were an extraordinary development, and, though they may encounter
short-term interruptions, they will likely revive in different forms in either the same or different countries. Meanwhile, the regional sectarian polarization that began with the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has been aggravated as a result of the conflict in Syria and permeated the entire region in varying degrees. The relative stability in countries that have not yet experienced uprisings and have implemented welfare-promoting social policies bears the risk of being contaminated.

It is plausible that countries with a Muslim majority such as Nigeria, Niger, Chad, the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, and Somalia, which are already beleaguered by various problems, will continue to face instability. In recent years, these countries have become part of Turkey’s field of interest through commercial, political, and cultural relations. The escalating instability in this geography and the Middle East will have numerous negative consequences for Turkey. Since this instability stems from rivalries between radical Islamic groups and sectarian polarization, radical groups could grasp political authority in these countries.

**Observations**

- *The establishment of a modus vivendi between the values of the West and the Islamic world will be one of the most fundamental geopolitical and geostrategic challenges of the twenty-first century.*

- *The West’s conflation of Islam and terror reflects a prejudiced and unilateral worldview. Nevertheless, this perception is still a diplomatic reality that affects global politics.*

- *The Islamic world has also had to face a structural paradigm shift because of the Arab uprisings. Since each country will evolve within the framework of its own idiosyncratic internal and external dynamics and find homegrown solutions, this process will likely be long and painful.*
As a democratic and secular country with a Muslim majority situated along geopolitical fault lines, Turkey should reckon that it will also be a target for Islamic radicalism.

Turkey will overcome the ambiguities concerning its identity by acceding to initiatives that are reshaping global geo-economic balances such as the TTIP; maintaining a secular and democratic state based on the rule of law; and progressing further on the track of human rights and universal values.

Muslim-majority Turkey will assume an important role in the global geopolitical order to the extent that it avoids getting contaminated by radical jihadi movements, internalizes universal values, and achieves economic, social, and cultural progress.

Since the First Gulf War in the 1990s, neighboring Iraq has impacted Turkey’s economy, politics, and security to a great extent. While Iraq cannot pose a military threat to Turkey, the country’s civil war and the dissolution of its state structure will present political and security risks as well as humanitarian and social problems similar to those emanating more recently from Syria. Stability in northern Iraq, on the other hand, will be of vital importance and help solve the Kurdish problem in Turkey and provide secure energy supplies.

The withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Iraq without establishing a permanent, secure, and stable structure led to serious negative consequences. Iran has expanded its influence in the region, while the exclusionary policies of the previous Iraqi administration raised the risk of fragmentation and provided a fertile ground for the recruitment of radical militants. It remains to be seen whether the next Iraqi administration will pursue a more inclusive policy and reduce factionalism. The fragmentation of Iraq along sectarian and ethnic lines carries major security risks also for Lebanon and Jordan.
After Afghanistan, jihadist terrorist groups have migrated to Iraq and Syria, posing a multifaceted security and stability problem for the Middle East and Turkey. ISIS has gradually expanded its territorial holdings in Syria and Iraq by resorting to extremely violent methods and terror, creating state structures, and declaring a Caliphate.

**Observations**

- *Turkey will have to struggle with the radical Islamic groups that have become entrenched to its south. The branches of radical terrorist organizations such as ISIS in Turkey but also in the EU and elsewhere render this problem a major security threat for Turkey and other countries.*

- *This serious phenomenon necessitates calls for bilateral and multilateral understanding of and mechanisms for cooperation—including on intelligence sharing—for Turkey and other countries that are on the transit routes of people and equipment.*

The civil war in Syria festers as a humanitarian crisis, and the country’s future remains unknown. Turkey mobilizes all of its capacity to provide humanitarian aid. On the other hand, the security vacuum in Syria and the social tragedy are destabilizing Turkey’s border provinces. Radical religious organizations that are affiliated with the warring parties in Syria and are burrowing into Turkey’s border provinces and infiltrating Iraq present a huge security risk for Turkey. Refugees both within and outside the camps could threaten public security due to the potential of infiltration.
Recommendation

*Turkey is paying a steep price as it is one of the countries that receive the highest number of refugees from the conflict zone. If the Syrian refugee camps become permanent, they may threaten Turkey’s security. While the humanitarian aspects of Syrian migration cannot be disregarded, Turkey should reflect on the long-term consequences of this migration for its economy, society, and demography.*

Although Turkey and Iran have no border conflict, the two countries’ views differ on global and regional issues, especially concerning Iraq and Syria. Yet as Turkey and Iran’s overlapping interests outweigh their differences, the two countries seek to craft policies to serve their mutual interests.

Turkey was hit the hardest by the sanctions imposed on Iran because of the latter’s nuclear program. Iran may not be a direct threat to Turkey, but its exploitation of the Shia-Sunni divide in its policies towards Eurasia, Caspian Sea, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Gulf countries, Yemen, Israel, and its relations with the United States are bound to increase Turkey’s security concerns. Iran is also interested in the Kurdish issue.

Iran’s efforts to develop long-range missiles and nuclear weapons pose a potential threat to Turkey and multiply the global and regional risk factors. Simply put, Turkey cannot remain indifferent to Iran’s efforts to weaponize its nuclear capability.

Iran’s military nuclear capacity may also induce others in the region to go for a similar option. Israel is unlikely to give up its nuclear arsenal for the foreseeable future, either. In the regional environment of nuclear uncertainty, NATO’s security umbrella will serve as the primary element of deterrence.
Observation

Just as Iran’s military nuclear program constitutes a serious threat to Turkey, any military operation to destroy Iran’s nuclear capacity will pose a commensurate threat to the region and the world, and leave Turkey confronted with new problems.

The dynamics that played out after the Mavi Marmara incident revealed once again that Turkey and Israel should maintain relations and engage in dialogue for the sake of their respective security and for peace in the region.

Observation

Israel is a part of both the problems and the solution in the Middle East. One should not expect for policies that exclude Israel to bring peace to the region. Turkey should keep this in mind while shaping its regional policies.

The Russian Federation and Turkey have indeed diverged in their Eurasia and Middle East policies. Yet the two countries’ bilateral trade, most notably in natural gas, has expanded in recent years to the point that Turkey depends on Russian energy supplies. The boom in economic and human exchanges has partially eroded the former deficit of trust between the two countries. In addition to its dependence on Russian natural gas, Turkey has taken a forward-looking strategic risk by entrusting the construction of the nuclear power plant project at Mersin to Russia.

Turkish-Russian relations will likely involve both dialogue and competition for the foreseeable future. The risk of indirect hostility between the two countries, however, might emerge if the territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh escalates into a large-scale conflict. In such a conflict, intervention by any country
outside the region will be physically impossible. Turkey has a contractual bond with Azerbaijan and will need to conduct a comprehensive risk analysis to determine its policy if such a conflict erupted.

**Observation**

*Russia and Turkey regard each other as important neighbors and partners. Their commercial, economic, and social relations continue to improve, even though they have differing perceptions of interest and have both fought in the past. Turkey’s energy dependence on Russia is a security risk that needs to be addressed.*

The ongoing state of war between Armenia and Azerbaijan concerning the status of Nagorno-Karabakh also has a bearing on Turkey’s bilateral relations with Russia. In addition to its occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia—with its close ties to Russia—continues to pressure Turkey over the centennial of the 1915 incidents, which makes it impossible to normalize relations.

Russia, meanwhile, seeks to dominate the Eurasian hinterland; Georgia experienced a partial loss of sovereignty following its conflict with Russia in 2008.

The recognition of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones in the Black Sea by all maritime countries will contribute to the long-term stability of this inland sea. The instability in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, as well as Russia’s annexation of Crimea, however, have jeopardized the security environment in the Black Sea. Turkey helped establish initiatives such as Blackseafor and Blacksea Harmony, but these are now on shaky ground after the Ukraine crisis. The Montreux Convention accorded the Black Sea a very special status. In the context of the aforementioned crisis, the strict respect for and meticulous application of the provisions of the convention will make Turkey more secure.
The Ukraine crisis and Russia’s annexation of Crimea have jeopardized the security environment in the Black Sea.

Turkey also devotes considerable energy to events in the Caucasus and the Caspian region, not least because of the rich energy reserves there. The lack of a consensus on the status of the Caspian Sea’s energy resources and the revival of the frozen conflicts between Caucasus countries could imperil the security of energy supplies for Turkey and the EU, and the safety of pipelines in the region. On the other hand, the transportation of Kazakh and Turkmen hydrocarbons through Turkey to world markets will contribute to Turkey’s energy security and diversification.

Turkish-Greek tensions escalated as a result of the Cyprus problem in the 1960s and bilateral issues—most importantly, each country’s maritime rights and borders in the Aegean Sea in particular—remain intractable.

Today, there is relative moderation in the approach of all parties to chronic problems, partly due to the destructive economic crisis in Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus. Despite the lack of progress on chronic problems, parties are acting peacefully and increasing commercial, economic, and cultural cooperation. The newly discovered offshore energy reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean could also help forge a rapprochement around a common welfare and security project.

The Cyprus issue has entered a new phase with the economic crisis in Southern Cyprus and the discovery of hydrocarbon resources. The fair distribution of resources within Cyprus and the means and routes for transporting them to world markets are important issues for Turkey. This new process could well increase tension among the parties. It is also possible that, with Turkey becoming a transit country, it could help facilitate a resolution in Cyprus.
The international disputes and conflicts that will preoccupy the international community and Turkey for the foreseeable future will occur as much in the eastern and southern Mediterranean as in the Middle East. As the Mediterranean gradually becomes a geopolitical center of gravity for energy production and transportation, problems are likely to multiply. Following its actions in Crimea and Ukraine, Russia is trying to upgrade its navy in the Black Sea so that it can project power to the Mediterranean and other regions.

**Observation**

*The recently discovered energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean may have important geopolitical consequences. The continuing ambiguity in Cyprus’s status and the fact that the relevant parties have not yet reached a full consensus on maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean magnify regional security risks. This region is also vitally important for Turkey because EU members attribute a strategic importance to having diversified sources of energy supplies and because global energy powers, including the United States and Russia, have interests there.*

**Recommendation**

*The recently discovered energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean present an historic opportunity to promote policies that raise the region’s welfare and promote cooperation and peace instead of war or conflict. These are realistic policies that correspond with Turkey’s long-term interests.*
Due to its domestic and international dimensions, as well as demographic aspects, the Kurdish problem is complex and more difficult to solve than it appears. Aside from separatist Kurdish nationalism, Turkey has never encountered a similar threat to its integrity. Deepening instability in the Middle East also aggravates the Kurdish problem and makes it more transnational.

The “solution process” launched to resolve the Kurdish problem is of historic importance. Its success would likely bring radical changes for Turkey and the Middle East, as it is founded on the core ideal of building a common future together. Yet the process is fraught with major vulnerabilities, risks, and manipulations at the same time. In addition to Turkey, the Kurdish problem also concerns Iran, Iraq, Syria, and some outside powers.

**Recommendations**

- *The solution process for the Kurdish problem will likely experience fits and starts. The principal objective should be to lay down arms and attain a solution that maintains the territorial integrity of Turkey, preserves the unitary state structure, and fully respects universal values.*

- *It will not be sufficient for Turkey to resolve the Kurdish issue only in its own territory; Kurds living in neighboring countries will also occupy Turkey’s agenda.*

- *The solution process will require the implementation of dynamic policies including comprehensive and necessary exit strategies and assessing the attitudes of various domestic, regional and global actors, as well as the trans-border nature of the issue.*
Turkey: Observations and Recommendations

- Recent developments in Turkey's surrounding geography constitute a difficult, painful, and risky period. This instability will presumably continue for the foreseeable future.

- Turkey will be in the position to weather the risks and threats created by all the sources of instability in its region.

- Turkey's geographic location requires dynamic statecraft, experience, historical awareness, and deterrent military force.

- In the management of potential risks, statecraft has become as important as military force.

- Located in such a critical geography, Turkey cannot embrace an introverted policy that renounces globalization.

- Institutional legitimacy and the rule of law consolidate national solidarity in a democratic and pluralist society. In a region going through such turbulence, the state must maintain its function and survival along with its respectability in the eyes of its people.

- Turkey can assume an important role at the regional and global levels to the extent that it consolidates its national integrity and converges with universal norms of democracy.

- In a rapidly changing regional and global context, Turkey must formulate a sustainable foreign policy that includes exit strategies.

- Foreign policies pursued vis-a-vis regional countries should reflect an understanding of "realpolitik" to mitigate risks.

- Turkey should maintain its status as a "natural mediator and facilitator" by understanding the realities of the region.
• *Competition and conflicts of interest between global and regional actors can be expected to continue in Turkey’s surrounding geography for the foreseeable future. Therefore, Turkey must advance its statecraft to “manage differences and discrepancies.”*
“Civilian officials who are responsible for planning and implementing Turkey’s security policies should coordinate with the armed forces to ensure the highest level of safeguarding of national interests. Changing paradigms necessitate that previous ‘state-centered’ security policies be restructured, taking into consideration ‘individual-oriented’ approaches to security.”
SOME OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON TURKEY’S SECURITY POLICY AND INSTITUTIONS

1. Policymaking

Turkey has to reorganize its state structure and policymaking so that they meet the exigencies of the twenty-first century. To this end, institutional structures should be created to enable think tanks, universities, relevant professional organizations, and civil society organizations to contribute to policymaking in every field.

After all, security is multidimensional and involves policies related to energy, economy, science and technology, natural resources, the judiciary, and education.¹

Turkey’s security policy should therefore identify the country’s security needs with a holistic perspective and in light of projections about the future that are based on sound and rational assessments.

Turkey must design and implement a dynamic reform process concerning national security that seeks to constantly analyze regional and global developments and enhance both the accountability mechanisms of security institutions and the parliament’s authority to inquire into issues of national security. Civil society should also contribute to defining national security, which can only be assured if they have access to the necessary information. In fact, Turkey should seek the contributions and support of all segments of the society to reform its security institutions.

¹Considering the scope and depth of the aforementioned policy fields, these subjects were excluded from the content of this report and no institutional recommendations were made regarding these fields.
Public institutions should be aware that the concept of national defense is not merely the responsibility of the military and make contributions to national defense in their respective fields. Accordingly, the active role that political authorities in Turkey have played in recent years in the design and implementation of national security policies is a positive development. Yet this should be more substantial. For instance, the number of civilian personnel who are trained in defense policies in Turkey remains scant.

One shortcoming is that politicians, universities, and civil society organizations only make limited contributions to developing national security policies. In this critical period of transformation, it is essential to train qualified civilian personnel who can contribute to security policymaking.

Civilian officials who are responsible for planning and implementing Turkey’s security policies should coordinate with the armed forces to ensure the highest level of safeguarding of national interests. Changing paradigms necessitate that previous “state-centered” security policies be restructured, taking into consideration “individual-oriented” approaches to security.

Traditionally constructed around military threat perceptions, Turkey’s national security structure needs to be reevaluated. The belt of instability in the geography surrounding Turkey is expected to persist for the foreseeable future. In addition to military threats, other problems include the fight against terrorism and secessionist tendencies, keeping energy and maritime transportation routes open, economic vulnerabilities, natural disasters, climate change, refugees and unregulated migration, and cyber-attacks.

Parallel to previous plans that focused on success in military conflicts, public institutions and civil society organizations alike should develop crisis management skills.

Turkey should also reformulate the concept of deterrence in its defense policy by considering different factors such as the international context and Turkey’s geographic position in the region, in addition to its NATO membership.
Identification and continuous reassessment of risks and threats, and the formulation of concepts and strategies, should be ensured by the collaboration of relevant institutions: the Ministry of National Defence (MSB), Presidency of General Staff, National Security Council (MGK), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Intelligence Organization (MİT), etc.

2. Institutions

2.1 Turkish Armed Forces (TSK)

The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) played a pioneering role in the founding of the Republic of Turkey and will continue to live at the heart of Turkish society. In this framework, the perception of “martyrdom” for the country as the highest value constitutes the most important moral asset of TSK.

Yet the recent convictions of a group of TSK members on the basis of accusations that were allegedly unfounded have sullied the TSK’s reputation and, more importantly, undermined its morale.

Since its inception, the TSK has constituted the core of Turkey’s deterrence capacity. In addition to its role in national defense, the TSK has undertaken cross-border operations in the framework of NATO and the UN.

Its past experiences in Cyprus and in fighting the PKK have proved to all institutions of the TSK that a national infrastructure of technology and software are as fundamental to national security and defense policy as is sufficient military hardware.

The TSK is an institution that strives to modernize and prepare its structure and personnel for the future. In this context, the TSK implements training programs and plans that correspond with contemporary systems. Hence, it possesses both the accumulation of knowledge and experience as well as the staff and organizational structure that ensure peace and stability in its region.

At the same time, shifting security paradigms inside and
outside Turkey will pressure the TSK to constantly adapt. Through a number of legal regulations put in place, the TSK has entered a period in which it will further concentrate on its fundamental duties.

The TSK’s fundamental duty is to deter aggression, and, when required, prepare for war to secure the country’s independence and territorial integrity. In addition, the TSK needs to prepare itself to serve in certain domestic problems such as natural disasters, immigration, insurrection, etc. that are in line with the demands and assignments of the government.

Taking into consideration the risks and threats that confront Turkey, the TSK’s objective should be to redefine its mission and duties and craft a flexible and dynamic force and command structure that can fulfill them. The levels of force readiness will vary according to the nature of the risk or threat; in this respect, the objective should be to devise force structures with high mobility and ample firepower rather than those with static, frontline postures.

Since technology and weapon systems are evolving, the knowledge, expertise, and experience of all staff ranging from the private to the commander of the highest rank must also grow and become more professionalized. These points should be taken into consideration in the organization and command structure, and force commands should have greater authority in matters of personnel, staff training, appointment, promotion, operational planning and execution. Accordingly, the functions of headquarters as well as relations between the Turkish General Staff (TGS) and the Ministry of National Defence should be reevaluated within this framework.

Military intelligence and counter-intelligence are of the utmost importance. Establishing avenues of cooperation with the other intelligence units of the state can ensure the maximum level of cross-institutional coordination.

Research and development (R&D) is the sine qua non of the armed forces and should be institutionalized in a way to include coordination with other R&D organizations, universities, and
defense industry companies. Effective cyber security units should be established for the TSK’s General Staff and all its branches.

Meeting the needs of the armed forces is an important incentive to develop and commercialize technology. Taking into consideration the strict limitations that countries place on sharing military technology, a superior, homegrown defense structure is indispensable. Despite positive developments in relations between the TSK and science and technology institutions over recent years, this cooperation has yet to become a force multiplier.

While devising and constructing national security, it is an important requisite for the TSK’s weapons systems to have a national backbone. Having a national software infrastructure is an absolute necessity. For instance, especially through the initiative launched by the Navy (MİL-GEM, National Vessel Project), the accumulation of knowledge and experience required for procuring the navy vessels’ design, software, and hardware through national resources has been achieved. This project not only meets the demands of the TSK, but also lowers the imports and increases the exports of these items. Allied countries will continue to provide defense equipment or those weapons systems that require a certain amount of time to manufacture when there is an urgent need; in doing so, compliance with the inter-operability principle will be essential.

By evaluating global and regional developments on a regular basis and in line with the national security policies identified by the state, the TSK must renew its “National Military Strategic Concept” and adapt its institutional structure to the developments accordingly.

In Turkey’s surrounding geography, which is beset by peripheral risks, threats, and instabilities, it is critical that the TSK improves its capacity for flexible deployment and operational leveraging (mobility, flexibility, usability, firepower projection, sustainable operation).

The improvement and modernization of the TSK will depend on how quickly and successfully Turkey grows into a pluralist and participatory democracy that nurtures freedom, human rights, and the rule of law.
2.2 Ministry of Interior

The Ministry of Interior has defined its mission in the 2014-2019 Strategic Plan as follows:

“Based on fundamental rights and freedoms, the Ministry of Interior performs the duties of domestic security; ensuring the preservation and safety of our borders, coasts and territorial waters; devising effective border management and migration policies; founding effective provincial and district administrations and coordinating public services; raising the service standards of local administrations; providing civil registration and citizenship services; and supporting civil society with a human-centered approach.”

One of the prerequisites for the Ministry of Interior to fulfill this mission is to monitor global, regional, and local dynamics in order set up the necessary structure and organization.

The geography of Turkey involves an environment of intense permeability between domestic and external security problems. Growing instability on its borders, illegal movement of peoples, mass migrations, drugs and arms trafficking, and Turkey’s location along land and maritime transit routes further expand the duties and responsibilities of the Ministry of Interior.

Moreover, the ongoing uncertainty regarding maritime jurisdiction in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as the illegal migration attempts further increase the responsibility and importance of the Coast Guard Command in these regions.

Concerning recent discussions about restructuring the Gendarmerie General Command, it is crucial that the institution’s apolitical position is preserved and that its duties and authority over border and domestic security are compatible with the realities of national and regional security.

Another vital institution for the country’s security, the Turkish National Police should promptly distance itself from the current environment of controversy. In terms of its duty, authority, and equipment inventory, it should not overlap with the TSK and the Gendarmerie General Command.
The role of the Directorate General of Migration Management founded under the Ministry is expected to grow. Treating the mass migrations into Turkey merely as a matter of public order and a humanitarian problem may prove insufficient. Instead, this challenge needs to be addressed in the socio-cultural context by examining the impact on education, employment, and social rights, and by devising medium- to long-term integration policies. Reorganizing the Directorate General of Migration Management may be required to fulfill these tasks. A prerequisite for its success will be comprehensive coordination both within its own structure and with other relevant ministries and institutions.

While the outcome of the period called the “solution process” for the Kurdish problem is yet uncertain, the principle of the inalienability of national responsibility in domestic security must be given precedence. Along the same lines, within the framework of this process, the responsibilities of the Ministry’s General Directorate of Local Authorities, which are likely to expand, may necessitate reorganization.

2.3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In the twenty-first century, foreign policy has evolved into a determinant and the armed forces into a subsidiary construct. Turkey is accordingly adapting the ratio of statecraft and force that it employs in its policies.

As a valuable institution of the Republic, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a well-trained staff that has accumulated extensive experience.

At the same time, it can be observed that parallel to the globalizing world and the growing interest in regional and global challenges, the capacities for international representation in the Ministry are being greatly expanded. This quantitative expansion will require a diversification and a broadening of its human resources.
Diplomacy’s widened scope of engagement necessitates the training of diplomats with expertise in various fields. It would be of benefit to further commit to this recruitment and may be opportune to change the organizational structure in certain international thematic areas such as cyber security, nuclear, space, and global systems, in which Turkey has to play an active role.

2.4 National Security Council (MGK)

In addition to the capacities of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Interior and Justice to make precautionary recommendations on matters related to identifying domestic and external threats, monitoring alliances, the TSK, and internal security, it will be beneficial to create highly capable working units within the National Security Council (MGK) to research and analyze best practices across the world on the following issues:

- Cyber security,
- Energy security and nuclear technology,
- Water and other natural resources,
- Information, communication and software systems,
- Environment and climate change risks,
- Universal law and democratic practices (with EU references),
- Perceptions of Turkey in the world,
- Education/innovation and R&D, and
- Mechanisms for raising social awareness about risks and threats, and boosting morale in case of incidents.

These working units should be comprised of permanent civilian/military experts to present reports to the MGK.

A small coordination committee should be established within the Prime Ministry and all Ministries to follow global developments as well as issues of interest to the MGK.
Civil society organizations should be motivated, encouraged, and financed to draft objective and scientific research reports as well as studies in their respective fields of specialty. The best example are the numerous think-tanks in the United States that conduct studies which contribute to shaping foreign policy and the economic life of the country, and draft reports that closely monitor, evaluate, and analyze the performance of the U.S. government and the President and the issues of the day.

Finally, a fundamental duty of the MGK should be to define and formulate the interagency concept of holistic security.

2.5 National Intelligence Organization (MİT)

The chaotic nature of international relations today, along with the global and national risks and threats that have emerged in recent years that this report strives to define, oblige Turkey to better predict the future. Intelligence must be recognized as the field in which a covert struggle is sustained with the strictest adherence to national sovereignty rights. In this context, the most valid and reliable intelligence is that which is obtained through national means, while the intelligence provided by foreign services bears the risk of being deceptive, leading, or misleading on occasions.

Intelligence provides the most important contribution to formulating foreign policy and protecting national interests. With the analyses that it presents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the main actor, along with its ability to keep the diplomatic channels open, the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) should be able to swiftly mobilize the decision-making mechanisms of the state.

Important amendments were introduced to Law No. 2937 on the State Intelligence Services and National Intelligence Organization with the law dated April 26, 2014. Even though a number of its provisions have since been referred to the Constitutional Court, the duties of the MİT were redefined in accordance with the emerging needs on a statutory basis, thereby establishing clarity in this field.
Above all, success in intelligence necessitates creating and putting into practice both human resources and advanced technologies to meet Turkey’s intelligence requirements. Emphasis should be placed on employing the technology and R&D that Turkey has already achieved in matters of intelligence. Public-private sector cooperation should mobilize this potential.

In one respect, the state’s power lies in its possession, use, and protection of knowledge. Priority issues are protecting the state’s national communications and information systems against foreign interference through counter-espionage, entrenching the concept of confidentiality, and supporting national policies and decisions. The protection of economic assets, know-how efforts, sensitive technologies, primary resources, and various electronically controlled systems against indirect and direct cyber-attacks, ensuring public-private interactions, and the espousal and promotion of this culture are also quite important.

Intelligence is perceived as a subject of public interest and is prone to sensation in every country—perhaps even more so in Turkey. It is growing more important to shield the intelligence field from everyday controversies, but without ruling out rational, responsible, and scientific debate.

2.6 Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM)

The medium- to long-term priorities of Turkey’s “defense industry” policy for its national defense requirements should be determined within the framework of the defense industry vision.

It is essential that procurement programs be conducted and based on contracts drawn up in line with operational requirements. Preference should be given to R&D-focused contracts rather than procurement-focused ones.

The principle of interdependence should be respected to identify which product groups will be turned into project-based “contractual” production with industrialists; which products will be produced via joint investment under strategic cooperation with which countries; which near- to medium-term defense needs will
be procured from where; and which ones will be turned into a medium- to long-term cooperation beyond the understanding of simple “pay and buy.”

Cooperation with social enterprises and universities should be enhanced. In the same vein, public-private, multi-layered cooperation (SME-NGO) models should be introduced.

It would be opportune to eliminate the overlaps in jurisdiction among SSM, Ministry of National Defence, State Planning Organization (DPT), and Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) in this field and establish a central authority to implement joint long-term strategies.
“Turkey’s power in the twenty-first century depends above all on entrenching its institutional structures on a legitimate ground, harmonizing the civil society agenda with the political agenda, and developing a participatory democratic process.”
The most fundamental domestic security problem for Turkey is the shift from the unifying consensus of sharing a common fate to the axis of conflict and fragmentation. All segments of Turkish society share responsibility to combat ethnic, sectarian, and ideological fragmentation.

“Resilient societies” will undoubtedly be those that can transform their socio-economic structures and make the largest investments in intellectual and technological production, modern education, and academic research. In this sense, “innovative societies” that attain an information economy, question established paradigms, and build dynamic relationships with all domestic segments as well as international society will be pioneers. During this transformation, the empowerment of women, the education of young generations, and “active citizenship” will become critical. In this context, there is a need for a “deliberating civil society.”

Secularism, pluralism, and the rule of law have played a prominent role in the development of democracy and civil society in Turkey. Secularism, which is the essence of democracy, has also unified various social segments on a common ground.

Today, the problems brought forth by globalization call for a new social contract. Western democracies, for instance, are already redefining the relationship between the individual and the state. Similarly, new political and legal frameworks such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are expected to be formulated on the basis of the rule of law and citizenship. Turkey
should not sit on the sidelines while these frameworks are being developed.

Turkey’s power in the twenty-first century depends above all on entrenching its institutional structures on a legitimate ground, harmonizing its civil society agenda with its political agenda, and developing a participatory democratic process.

Turkey will overcome both the domestic crises and external threats that it encounters to the extent that it strengthens civil society through the rule of law and transforms itself in the fields of science and technology. To reiterate, civil society and the rule of law constitute yet another important dimension of Turkey’s security.

At the same time, it is also critical to establish mechanisms that facilitate communication between various segments of the society.

For Turkey to maintain long-term domestic stability and lay the framework for a more secure future, it must ensure that none of its citizens feels excluded or treated as a minority. Consequently, it must consolidate trust and respect in the rule of law and implement its policies with modern standards.
ADDITIONAL OPINION

Under 2.2 Ministry of Interior, in addition to the section on the reorganization of the Gendarmerie General Command:

“Previously, the security of the borders with Syria and Iraq and part of the Iranian border was maintained by the Gendarmerie; as of 1984, however, the Gendarmerie was obliged to shift its efforts to a great extent towards domestic security duties. Per the request of the Ministry of Interior and Gendarmerie General Command and in line with the existent legislation, this responsibility and duty were transferred to Land Forces Command, as in other land borders. It was after many years that this task could finally be handed over. Despite this change, the Gendarmerie continues to need the support of Land Forces (and even Air Forces at times) to fulfill its domestic security duties; hence, the return to the previous practice will inevitably create vulnerability for both border security and domestic security due to the Gendarmerie’s capacity in terms of personnel, weapons, and equipment.”

Oktar Ataman
Oktar Ataman

Retired general Oktar Ataman was born in Istanbul. He graduated from the Turkish Military Academy in 1961 and Turkish Artillery School in 1963. Oktar Ataman served in Turkish Army units as artillery battery executive and battery commander until 1966. Ataman also worked in various ranks as assistant liaison officer to the United Nations Command, as deputy national representative at the Military Armistice Commission, as well as serving as Assistant Military Attaché in the Republic of South Korea between 1966 and 1968. After returning to Turkey, he served in artillery units until 1973. In 1975, he graduated from the Turkish Army War College as general staff officer. In the same year, he was appointed as a staff officer in Turkish General Staff Plans and Operations Department. He was later assigned as an instructor in the Army War College. In 1977, he graduated from the Royal Army Staff College of United Kingdom. He served as a staff officer in the Plans and Policy Division of NATO SHAPE Headquarters in Belgium, Headquarters executive officer of Turkish Land Forces Command, Regimental Commander of the Corps of Cadets in Turkish Military Academy, and head of the Instruction Department of the Turkish Army War College during the period between 1980 and 1988. Oktar Ataman was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General in 1988 and served as the Head of Turkish General Staff Plans and Operations Department and the Commander of 14th Mechanized Infantry Brigade. He was promoted to the rank of Major General in 1992 and had served as the Head of the Turkish General Staff Strategy and Force Planning Department and the Commander of First Mechanized Infantry Division. Ataman who was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General in 1997 served as the Chief of Operations (J3) in the Turkish General Staff, and the Turkish Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee in Brussels/Belgium, and the commander of 6th Army Corps. Ataman was promoted to rank of “General” in 2001. With this rank he was assigned as Commander of NATO Joint Command Headquarters Southeastern Europe in İzmir and later as Commanding General of Turkish 3rd Army in Erzincan; he was retired on the grounds of age on September 1, 2004. He is married and he has two children as well as one grandchild.

Gülnur Aybet

Professor Gülnur Aybet is the Head of Department of Political Science and International Relations and the Director of the Centre for Security Studies, at Bahçeşehir University. She returned from the UK to Turkey and founded the Department of International Relations at Özyeğin University in 2013. She taught at the University of Kent in the UK from 2001 to 2013, and previously at University of Nottingham in the UK, Bilkent University and İzmir University of Economics in Turkey. Her fields of expertise are international security, transatlantic relations with special reference to NATO and the EU, post-conflict reconstruction, and state building. Professor Aybet received her BA
Hons Economics and Public Administration from Royal Holloway, University of London, UK, MSc in International Relations from University of Southampton, M. Phil in War Studies from King’s College, University of London, and her PhD in International Relations from the University of Nottingham. While at the University of Kent, she designed and directed the first Master’s program in International Security. She has been a Principal Investigator to many research projects funded by the British Academy, NATO, and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She was also a visiting scholar at international academic institutions such as St. Antony’s College of Oxford University, Johns Hopkins University, and the Woodrow Wilson Center. She has been involved as a consultant on international security issues in various state institutions and international organizations including NATO and the EU, and is a well-known commentator on current affairs in international media (especially the BBC and Channel 4). She has also been a visiting faculty member at Sabancı and Bilgi Universities in Istanbul, and the NATO Defense College in Rome. Aybet is the editor of the “Contemporary Turkey” book series published by I.B. Tauris in London. She is a regular participant of the Turkish-British “Tatlı Dil Forum,” a member of the Council of Management of the British Institute at Ankara, and a member of Global Relations Forum. In 2009, she was ranked as one of the top 20 most powerful Muslim women in the United Kingdom by The Times.

Salim Dervişoğlu

Salim Dervişoğlu was born in 1936 in İzmit. He graduated from the Naval War College in 1957 with the rank of Sub-Lieutenant. He served on various naval and shore duties for the Turkish Naval Forces. Following his education at the Naval Military Academy through 1965-1967, he served as Staff Officer at Sultanhisar Ship and subsequently the Commander of Gayret Destroyer. He received his MS in Management from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, USA from 1972 to 1973. From 1974 to 1977 he worked at the NATO headquarters in Brussels. Then, from 1977 to 1979, after working as a commodore on the Destroyer Flotilla 3 ship, he served on various shores duties. He became a Rear Admiral on August 31, 1981. He served as the president of Logistics and Personnel in the Turkish Naval Forces, and Commander of the Landing Fleet, Assault Boat Flotilla, and War Fleet. Dervişoğlu has also served as Commander of the Turkish Naval Academy, and Chief of Intelligence of the TGS. He carried out NATO duties in Naples for two years. As Vice-Admiral, Dervişoğlu also served as the Deputy Secretary General of the Turkish National Security Council, as Chief of Staff of the Naval Forces, and Northern Sea Area Command. As Full Admiral, he served as Fleet Commander from 1995 to 1997, and retired after serving as Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces from 1997 to 1999. Dervişoğlu is currently Chairman of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies, Deputy Chairman of the Diplomacy and Security Association as well as a member of Global Relations Forum. He speaks English and French.
Memduh Karakullukçu

Memduh Karakullukçu is the Vice-Chairman and President of Global Relations Forum (GRF). He is also the Founding Partner of the Turkish online legal informatics initiative, kanunum.com. Previously, he has served as the senior advisor to the Chairwoman of Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) and as the Founding Managing Director of Istanbul’s leading science park, Istanbul Technical University (İTÜ) ARI Teknokent, currently an innovation community of over one hundred technology companies. During his tenure at İTÜ, Mr. Karakullukçu was the senior advisor to the President, the coordinator of the Law, Technology and Policy graduate program and the strategic advisor at the University’s Center for Satellite Communications. Mr. Karakullukçu has served as a member of the academic staff at the London School of Economics and İTÜ. His earlier academic work includes research commissioned by the IMF and the World Bank on inflation dynamics, debt instruments and debt markets. His recent policy work at GRF includes global energy analysis, technology-related security issues, global economic/financial governance, and the economic prospects of the MENA region. Earlier in his career, Mr. Karakullukçu worked as a specialist in structured finance in London and Istanbul. Mr. Karakullukçu received his B.S. in Electrical Engineering and in Economics at MIT, his MSc in Finance at the LSE and his J.D. at Columbia University. He is a member of the New York State Bar.

Hüsamettin Kavi

After receiving his MSc from Istanbul Technical University, Department of Civil Engineering, Hüsamettin Kavi began his career at the family company Kavi Kablo ve Emaye Bobin Teli San. A.Ş., where he served as Executive Director from 1989 to 2002. Currently, he is the Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of BEMKA A.Ş., and Chairman of GTE Endüstri Sistemleri A.Ş., a company that offers project application, representation and consultancy services in the cement, energy, iron & steel, and glass sectors. Kavi is a founding member of the Turkish Young Businessmen Association, where he has also served as Vice President (1990-1994). He is a member of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry Council, where he has served as Board Member (1991-1993), Chairman (1993-2001, four consecutive terms) and Speaker (2001-2009). At the same time, he was the Co-Chairman of Turkey–EU Joint Consultative Committee (1995-2000 and 2002-2004). He has served as Member of the Science Board of the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) (2001-2009), Board Member of Turk Telekom (2003-2005), Board Member of Akenerji A.Ş. (2001-2010), and Chairman of the Istanbul 2010 European Capital of Culture Agency Advisory Board (2008-2011). In 2011, he was elected to his current position as a Board Member of the Turkish Electric, Electronic and Service Exporters Union (TET). In 2014, he was elected as a Board Member of Mapfre Genel Sigorta A.Ş.
Sönmez Köksal
Sönmez Köksal is a retired career diplomat who has served as Ambassador of Turkey to France, Iraq, and Permanent Delegate to the Council of Europe. He was Undersecretary of State in charge of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization from 1992 to 1998. Mr. Köksal has served in several posts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including as Deputy Director General in charge of Multilateral Economic Relations, Deputy Permanent Delegate to the EEC, Director of the Middle East and Africa Department, and Director of the Policy Planning Department. Mr. Köksal was until recently President of the Board of Trustees of the Istanbul Commerce University and a member of the academic staff at İşık University. He is currently a Board Member of Global Relations Forum and a member of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies in Istanbul. Mr. Köksal is a graduate of the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University.

Ergun Mengi
Ergun Mengi retired in 2007 as Rear Admiral after 29 years of service with the Turkish Navy. He has served in several combat vessels of the Navy as Operations Officer, Executive Officer and for four years as Commanding officer. His headquarter works were in Navy and TGS Plans and Policies Division as Action Officer, Branch Chief and Head of Department. Through 1995-1998 Admiral Mengi served as Project Officer in the Western European Union's headquarters in Brussels. As Admiral, he served as the Chief of Intelligence Department of TGS from 2003 to 2005, and as Commander of Fast Patrol Boat Fleet from 2005 to 2007. Following his retirement, he joined the Center for Eurasia Strategic Studies (ASAM) as Advisor to the Chairman. He is currently working in Atılım University. Mengi graduated from the Naval War College in 1978, upon which he completed his studies at the Naval War Academy and the Armed Forces College. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from Kocaeli University and has completed his PhD in International Relations at Ankara University.

Mustafa Özbey
Mustafa Özbey was born in Ankara in 1946. He joined the Naval High School in 1960 and joined the Navy in 1967 with the rank of Lieutenant Junior Grade. After completing his training at the Naval War Academy from 1974 to 1976, he started his new assignment at the TGS Plans and Policy Division as Staff officer. He continued to attend advanced training programs both in Turkey and abroad from 1976 to 1992 and served at NATO Headquarters in Brussels as Force Planning Officer for three years. He also served as Commander and Commodore of Frigates. He was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral in 1992. He served as the Chief of Naval Plans and Principles Division in Turkish Naval Forces Command, and assumed command of Fast Patrol Boats Fleet. After being promoted to Senior Rear Admiral in 1996, he served as Department Head of the TGS's Greece-Cyprus Office. He then assumed Mine Fleet Commander and Chief of Staff of Turkish Naval Fleet positions at the same rank. He retired in 2001 by his own request. Özbey, since then, has worked as consultant and executive in private sector companies, been a member of the Board of Directors.
of Erciyas Steel Pipe Co. and the partner of Hydromx International. He is also a member of Global Relations Forum.

Ümit Pamir

Ümit Pamir is a former career diplomat. After graduating from the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1965. Earlier in his career, he has served in several posts at the Turkish Embassies in London, Rome, and Budapest, as well as at the Turkish Permanent Delegation to NATO. He has served several posts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including as Director of the Middle East and Africa Department and Director of the Policy Planning Department. Subsequently, he served at the Turkish Permanent Mission of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (1990-1991), in Algeria (1991-1995) and in Greece (1995-1997) as the Turkish Ambassador. From 1997 to 2000, Mr. Pamir assumed the duties of Chief Advisor to Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz on foreign policy. Before his retirement, he served as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (2000-2004) and to NATO (2004-2007). Ambassador Pamir was a member of the group of “Wise Men” selected by the Secretary General of NATO for drafting the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance. He is currently a member of Global Relations Forum, Global Policy Trends Center, the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (Bilgesam), and TASAM.

İlter Türkmen

İlter Türkmen served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1980 and 1983. Throughout his diplomatic career, Türkmen has worked as Director General, Deputy Undersecretary, and Undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and also as Ambassador of Turkey in Athens, Moscow, and Paris and as Permanent Representative of Turkey to the UN. Following his retirement, from 1991 to 1996, Türkmen served at the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) as Under-Secretary General of the United Nations. He was a columnist regularly writing on domestic and foreign policy for the daily Hürriyet for the next nine years. He is the Chairman of the Middle East and Balkan Studies Foundation. Ambassador Türkmen is a member of Global Relations Forum, Foreign Policy and Defense Group, and the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (Bilgesam). İlter Türkmen is a graduate of Ankara University Faculty of Political Science.
Erkut Yücaoğlu
Dr. Erkut Yücaoğlu completed his undergraduate studies in Mechanical Engineering at Robert College (1969), and obtained his M.Sc. and Ph.D. in Industrial Engineering from Stanford University in 1971 and in 1973 respectively. As the founder of Bosphorus University Industrial Engineering Department, he served as Head of Department between 1973 and 1976. Dr. Erkut Yücaoğlu subsequently worked as Koç Holding Planning Coordinator (1976-1979); Assistant General Manager at Turkish Electric Industry Inc. (1979-1982), and General Manager for General Electric Company for Turkey and Regional Director for the Middle East (1983-1991). Since 1991, Yücaoğlu is the Chairman of MAP-TURKUAZ Group. After ten years on TÜSİAD’s (Turkish Industry & Business Association) Board of Directors, he served as the Chairman between 1999 and 2000. From 2011 to 2015, he worked as the President of TÜSİAD’s High Advisory Council.

Nigar Ağaoğulları Yalınkılıç (Project Director)
Nigar Ağaoğulları Yalınkılıç, the Executive Director of Global Relations Forum, joined GRF in 2009 as a Program Director and has coordinated GRF’s Task Force on Energy. Currently, she oversees and coordinates GRF’s Track-II projects with Russia and GRF’s Task Force on Security. Ms. Yalınkılıç graduated from Georgetown University in 2002 with a B.S. degree (cum laude) in Foreign Affairs concentrating in Culture & Politics as well as minorities, and she completed a certificate program in Muslim-Christian Relations. She holds an MSc degree (merit) in Social and Public Communication from the London School of Economics with specializations in corporate communications and social psychology. Before Ms. Yalınkılıç started her career at an international law firm in New York, she worked at Western Policy Center in Washington, DC and at the Turkish Mission to the UN. Prior to joining GRF, she specialized in Strategy and Business Development and served as a communication consultant to several companies. Ms. Yalınkılıç is fluent in Turkish and English, and conversational in French and Greek.

Ali Serkan Türkmenoğlu (Project Associate)
Ali Serkan Türkmenoğlu was born in Adana, Turkey in 1988. He graduated from Istanbul Technical University (İTÜ) Department of Electrical Engineering in 2011. During his undergraduate studies, he interned at Enerjisa and Isken. After participating in the first term of the Young Scholars Seminars (2010) for university students organized by GRF, he started interning at GRF to later join GRF’s Executive Staff as of September 2011. He worked as an “Associate” in 2012 and a “Senior Associate” in 2013. Türkmenoğlu worked on the technical calculations and editing process of the GRF Energy Task Force Report published at this term. As of 2014, he has been promoted to the position of Program Director. Within this scope, he serves as the Director of the GRF Young Scholars Abroad Seminar Program, Project Associate of the “Turkey’s Approach to Security in the 21st Century” Task Force, and the Co-Coordinator of the Roundtable Series on “Rule of Law, Institutions and Development.” Türkmenoğlu is also responsible for managing GRF’s website.
The list of guest experts who shared their invaluable opinions with the Task Force members is as follows:

**Geoffrey Aronson**  
Director, Foundation for Middle East Peace

**Prof. Sertaç Hami Başeren**  
Faculty Member, Ankara University Department of International Relations

**Murad Bayar**  
Former Undersecretary of Defense Industries; Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister

**Prof. Temel Belek**  
Former Vice President and Faculty Member of the Department of Mechanical Engineering (Ret.), Istanbul Technical University (İTÜ)

**Hüseyin Dirioğlu**  
Former NATO Assistant Secretary General; Ambassador

**Prof. Ekrem Ekinci**  
Former Vice President and Faculty Member of the Department of Chemical Engineering (Ret.), Istanbul Technical University (İTÜ)

**Rogelio Francisco Emilio Pfirter**  
Former President, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); Ambassador (Ret.)

**Prof. Serhat Güvenç**  
Faculty Member, Kadir Has University Department of International Relations

**Dr. İbrahim Kalın**  
Former Deputy Undersecretary and Senior Advisor to the Prime Ministry; Spokesperson of the Presidency; Ambassador

**Prof. Ali Karaosmanoğlu**  
Director, Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research

**Ali Naci Koru**  
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ambassador

**Murat Özçelik**  
Former Undersecretary of Public Order and Security Bureau; Ambassador (Ret.)

**Prof. Gencer Özcın**  
Faculty Member, Istanbul Bilgi University Department of International Relations

**Dr. Ali Vaez**  
Senior Iran Expert, International Crisis Group (ICG)

**Prof. Fatoş Yarman Vural**  
Faculty Member, Middle East Technical University (METU) Department of Computer Engineering

**Dr. Ömer Faruk Yarman**  
Former Executive Director, HAVELSAN